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of the Lamar Bar
Of the dozen criminal cases decided by the Colorado Supreme
Court since September, 1952, including McBride v. People,' four
cases involved confidence game and in three the decision of the
lower court was reversed. This ratio shows the importance of confi-
dence game in our criminal law and the uncertainty as to just
what is confidence game in Colorado.
The Supreme Court in Lindsay v. People,2 decided in. 1949,
held that a defendant was not guilty of confidence game who re-
ceived money on a check on an existing bank in Sterling, Colorado,
dated January 8, 1947, when the account had been closed approxi-
mately three months prior thereto. The defendant said nothing
about whether or not the check was good, and other similar trans-
actions of various small amounts had occurred about the same time
at different places.
The Court said, page 253, "to eliminate further doubt and to
clear the course of prosecuting officers hereafter this court now
says that the making and passing of a check as in the instant case
is not within the meaning of the terms false or Bogus checks as set
out in Section 222."
The Supreme Court in Chasse v. People," decided at the same
term of court as the Lindsay case, affirmed a conviction of confi-
dence game where the defendant obtained from the Brown Palace
Hotel $20.00 on a check drawn on a non-existing bank in Detroit.
The defendant, after arrest, admitted that he had never had an
account in any bank in Detroit, and that he had no information
at the time he wrote the check that any such bank existed. Al-
though he had given a Detroit address, he did not know whether
such street or number existed. The defendant contended that since
he had obtained the money solely by the use of a false or bogus
check, the judgment could not stand. The court said, at page 163,
that the statute is violated "if the money is obtained solely by the
use of a false or bogus check." Another check was received in
evidence for the same amount to show a scheme or plan.
The Court said, at page 162, the statute may be violated by
any one of three methods, i. e., brace faro, bogus check, or confi-
dence game.
In McBride v. People,4 the defendant opened an account on
October 29 in a Boulder bank with a deposit of $55.00. On the
same day he drew out $35.00 and later drew out small amounts
reducing his balance to $12.42 by Nov. 3. He only made the original
deposit. On Saturday afternoon, November 3, he cashed a check
1126 Colo. 277, 248 P. 2d 725 ( ).
2119 Colo. 248, 202 P. 2d 951 (1948).




for $65.00 at a grocery store. This check, exhibit "A" was the
basis of the confidence game charge. He had also given a $40.00
check at this same market on October 30, and it was outstanding.
When the defendant cashed the $65.00 check, he was not questioned
about his bank account or asked if his check was good, but it was
cashed without hesitation. The same Saturday afternoon or eve-
ning, he cashed three other checks in the amount of $50.00, $20.00
and $30.00. In cashing all of the checks, he represented that he
needed the money to get his wife out of the-hospital. He immedi-
ately thereafter drove to Boulder, met his wife and went to Kan-
sas City, where he was arrested six weeks later.
The defendant contended that the check was neither false nor
bogus, that it was a genuine check drawn on an existing bank in
which the defendant actually had an account and that it bore his
own and not a fictitious signature.
The Court said at page 284, "A check calling for $65.00 upon
a bank wherein the maker knows he has less than $20.00 on de-
posit and intends to put no more in, is as false and bogus as any
check could be."
The Court said at page 285 as to whether the defendant re-
sorted to any fraudulent scheme by which he sought to obtain the
confidence of the complaining witness and as to whether the com-
plaining witness reposed any special confidence in the defendant;
that
The.giving of the check implied that the maker had
funds in the bank upon which it was drawn to cover it.
That his signing and tendering the same was as much a
representation of its worth as would have been his oral
assurance of its payment had he been directly ques-
tioned specifically in that regard.
The Court said, at page 286, his representation of need for
cash (to obtain his wife's release from the hospital), on this Satur-
day evening might have prompted granting his request. He prob-
ably needed the cash for that purpose, but this was only a half
truth. He failed to reveal to his victim that he had insufficient funds
in the bank. Neither did he reveal that he contemplated leaving
the state immediately without intention of returning or leaving a
forwarding address. He put his money raising campaign into ope-
ration on Saturday afternoon when the bank was closed. The
situation is such that the issue becomes solely one of intent.
The Court further said, at page 286, it is true that all short
checks are not false and bogus checks within the meaning of the
confidence game statute and that it takes more than merely a
short check to constitute the offense.5 Each case must be determined
upon the facts presented, and in the Lindsay case it is apparent
that no representations were made and nothing by way of induce-
ment said to the taker of the check to cause him to cash it.
People v. Lindsay, 119 Colo. 248, 202 P. 2d 951 (1948).
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The Court said further in the McBride case, page 286, the
primary issue in prosecution under the statute is the intent of
the defendant by deliberate plan, scheme and design and by means
of such (known to him to be) worthless, false and bogus check, to
trick, cheat and swindle another of his money or property.
In the case of Graham v. People,6 the defendant made a con-
tract with the Trinidad Boys Club to sponsor a donkey show and
received money on account of this contract. The Supreme Court
said, at page 353-354, that the People make no contention that
the newspaper clippings and letters presented by the defendant'
(as endorsement of his show) were false or bogus, and there is
no dispute that the donkey show was in existence. Nothing with
reference thereto was false or bogus. The Court said at best the
evidence showed a breach of contract due to financial difficulties.
In White v. People,7 the defendant by various false representa-
tions and the pawning of a watch obtained a loan of $20. The Court'
said, page 638, quoting from People v. Dolph,8 there can be no
doubt concerning the law in this jurisdiction as to whether a bogus
or false instrument, token, or device is essential to establish the
guilt of an accused upon a charge based upon the confidence game
statute. "We have held repeatedly that mere words are not sufficient
to warrant a conviction under that statute. To constitute the offense
the money must have been obtained or the attempt thereto made
by some false or bogus -means, token, symbol or device as dis-
tinguished from (words), however false and fraudulent. Here
the watch itself was not bogus. The uncontraverted evidence was
that it had a retail value of $29.75."
In the case of Lane v. People,9 decided May 11, 1953, the Court
said it was not confidence game, but the facts showed the estab-
lishment of a debtor and creditor relationship.
The Supreme Court in People v. Lindsay,0 stated that our
confidence game statute is identical in its terms with the Illinois
statute. The Illinois Statute 11 is as follows:
Every person who shall obtain or attempt to obtain
from any other person or persons money, property or
credit by means or by use of any false or bogus check or by
any other means, instrument or device commonly called
the confidence game shall be imprisoned in the peniten-
tiary not less than one year nor more than ten years.
(The words brace faro are not in the Illinois Statute.)
Under that statute the supreme court of Illinois holds that
the defendant is guilty of confidence game even though he uses
no bogus or false instrument, token or device. 12
'126 Colo. 351, 248 P. 2d 730 (1952).
'126 Colo. 365, 249 P. 2d 823 (1952).
'124 Colo. 553, 239 P. 2d 312 J(1951).
-........Colo ....... 257 P. 2d 578 (1953), 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 21, p. 331.
"119 Colo. at page 252.
Chap. 48, Illinois Rev. Stat., Sec. 256.
'People v. Rogers, 375 Illinois 54, 30 NE 2d 77 (1940).
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The Illinois Supreme Court stated in that case that the gist
of the crime of confidence game is obtaining the confidence of the
victim by some false representation or device. The statute was
designed to reach the class of offenders known as confidence men
who practice swindling schemes as various as the mind of man
is suggestive. It covers any scheme whereby a swindler fraudu-
lently wins the confidence of his victim and then swindles him
of his money or property by taking advantage of confidence fraud-
ulently obtained. If the transaction is a swindling operation, it is
immaterial that the form assumed is that of a lawful business
transaction.'-"
The crime of obtaining money or property by means of con-
fidence game is committed whenever money or property is obtained
by a bogus check.1
4
Without undertaking to analyze the various decisions of the
Colorado Supreme Court (and they are based on Colorado prece-
dent), it is submitted that the matter should be defined by the
legislature so the more desirable construction placed on the similar
statute by the Illinois courts will obtain and include that vast
field of swindling schemes where no false token is used and also
include a bogus check where the account is closed or no account
or on a non-existing bank regardless of whether there are any
fraudulent verbal representations.
The case of Wesner v. People 15 involved the taking of in-
decent liberties with a seven year old child. The Court held that
even though the court did not sufficiently examine the child to
determine competency prior to permitting her to testify, if the
testimony disclosed on the whole that she was qualified no preju-
dice occurred.
The Court also held that it was proper to show that the same
defendant with the same seven year old girl engaged in the same
offense five or six days after the crime was committed. The Court
said at page 405, where the facts of the subsequent similar offense
point to intent, scheme, design and plan, and are not too remote,
such evidence is admissible.
The Court also said, page 405, in sexual criminal offense, such
as we have before us, it is not so much the matter of revealing
the plan, scheme or design and intent of the normal mind with
criminal tendencies as it is to establish the unfortunate sexual
perversions of the person charged.
In Hahn v. People 16 the defendant was charged and convicted
of receiving stolen goods. He was also charged with being an
habitual criminal. After conviction he pleaded guilty to the habitual
counts. He waived pre-sentence investigation. No motion for new
trial was filed, but a petition was filed to vacate the sentence im-
13 People v. Martin, 372 Illinois 484, 24 N.E. 2d 380 (1939).
14 People v. Cathony, 376 Illinois 260, 33 N.E. 2d 473 (1941).
1126 Colo. 400, 250 P. 2d 124 (1952).
16126 Colo. 451, 251 P. 2d 316 (1952).
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posed on the defendant. He contended that the counts mentioned
in the habitual criminal charge were not proved to be felonies. The
Supreme Court held that where the counts alleged that the counts
committed in other jurisdiction were felonies a plea of guilty waived
proof as to the averments in the counts and need not be proved.
In the case of Eckhardt v. People 17 a prosecution witness re-
freshed his memory by reference to a memorandum. It was preju-
dicial error for the court to refuse defendant counsel the opportun-
ity of inspecting the memorandum for the purpose of cross-exam-
ination. The Court said that was the first time that point had been
before the Court.
In the case of Heinze v. People,18 the defendant was charged
in one count with driving while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor and with having been previously convicted of a similar of-
fense. The defendant pleaded not guilty and then made a motion
to quash because of improper joinder. The lower court overruled
the motion. The Supreme Court held that while the motion was
untimely, it was the duty of the court to require that the matter
of the former conviction be stated in a separate count, and the
court held that it was prejudicial error to establish the former
conviction before any proof as to the substantive offense. The fact
that the defendant took the witness stand and invited cross-
examination as to prior convictions did not cure the error of
charging the former convictions in the same count and proceeding
immediately to the proof of the former conviction.
The Court said that the accepted procedure in other jurisdic-
tions was to withhold consideration of the additional counts until
disposition had been made of the substantive count, as is done in
habitual criminal procedure.
Shore v. District Court 19 held two informations where dif-
ferent defendants were accused of distinct crimes cannot be con-
solidated for trial over the objection of any defendant, even though
the evidence to be produced would show that the charges were
based on the same set of circumstances. The Court said also in
this case that a writ of prohibition was the correct procedure.
In Ridley v. Young 20 the defendant in an interrogatory before
trial admitted he was driving the automobile. At the trial, the de-
fendant did not appear, but his answer to interrogatory was intro-
duced in evidence, and the Court ruled that this interrogatory could
be contradicted. The Supreme Court held that under the rule any
matter that is testified to may be contradicted by evidence. The
court said that there were two kinds of admissions-judicial ad-
missions and otherwise. Judicial admission is conclusive but an-
other admission is not conclusive, and evidence may be introduced
to contradict.
" 126 Colo. 458, 250 P. 2d 1009 (1952).
-- ----- Colo -.----- 253 P. 2d 596 (1953), 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 12, p. 167.
.. ........ Colo ......... 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 22, p. 340.
-...... Colo .......... 253 P. 2d 433, 1952-53 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 12, p. 164.
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